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Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal  
 
Divided by a Common Purpose  
 
Chan Kam Shing [2016] HKCFA 87 
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The appellant was a member of the triads. Following an order from his boss to ‘chop’ 
members of a rival organisation, he went searching for victims. When fellow gang 
members found some of their rivals, he went to join in their attack. The victim was 
fatally injured before the appellant arrived at the scene. The appellant’s murder 
conviction was based on his participation in the joint enterprise to ‘chop’ their rivals, 
with the court noting that his involvement constituted encouragement to other 
members of his gang. 
 
These facts do not necessarily call for an analysis in terms of joint enterprise liability 
(as opposed to aiding and abetting), as the Court readily accepts (at [100]), but then 
neither did the facts of Jogee. Both cases went to appeal because the robustness of the 
joint enterprise principles operating in their respective jurisdictions needed examining 
by their highest courts – in England because public and academic pressure to revise 
parasitic accessorial liability (PAL) had grown overwhelming; in Hong Kong because 
Jogee had thrown the correctness of the doctrine into doubt. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the doctrine of joint enterprise should continue to 
be applied in Hong Kong (at [97-98]). Ribeiro PJ (who delivered the leading 
judgment) identified three principal reasons for this: first, that secondary parties to a 
joint criminal enterprise deserve ‘to be regarded as gravely culpable’ (at [65]); 
secondly, that abolition of the joint enterprise doctrine would ‘deprive the law of a 
valuable principle for dealing with dynamic situations involving evidential and 
situational uncertainties which traditional accessorial liability rules are ill-adapted to 
addressing’ (at [71]); thirdly, that ‘Jogee’s introduction of the concept of “conditional 
intent” … gives rise to significant conceptual and practical problems’ (at [58]). 
 
Commentary 
 
The decision of Hong Kong’s Final Court of Appeal (HKFCA) in the present case 
deals another blow to the joined Supreme Court (UKSC) and Privy Council (JCPC) 
decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 
2 WLR 681. It follows hard on the heels of Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, in 
which the High Court of Australia also refused to follow the lead of their former 
imperial masters; both jurisdictions, in no uncertain terms, declined to abolish their 
respective variants of parasitic accessory liability, whereby parties to a joint criminal 
enterprise are convicted for incidental crimes committed by their associates-in-crime 
which the former foresaw but did not necessarily intend.  
While the judgment in Chan Kam Shing echoes some of the pragmatic reasons given 
in Miller for retaining joint enterprise liability, such as its undoubted usefulness in 
imposing liability in the face of evidential or situational uncertainties, the decision is 
more far-reaching in its outlook and offers some apposite criticisms that go to the 
 2 
very taxonomy of criminal complicity and the principles of attribution that underpin 
it. If Jogee, as is to be hoped, is to endure, our courts will need to address these 
concerns.  
 
Like its English equivalent, Hong Kong’s joint enterprise doctrine can be traced back 
to the Privy Council decision in Chan Wing-Siu [1985] AC 168. But while the UKSC 
concluded that there was no place for the Chan Wing-Siu principle in the common law 
of England and Wales (for it had led to an ‘over-extension’ of liability), Hong Kong’s 
top court thought joint enterprise worth retaining. 
 
Ribeiro PJ places joint enterprise liability within a framework of complicity that 
significantly differs from the one underlying Jogee. The latter was clearly based, 
albeit tacitly, on the analytical framework set out by Hughes LJ (as he then was) in R 
v A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622; [2011] QB 841 at [9], whereby an 
individual can become complicit-in-crime (1) by joint perpetration, (2) by aiding and 
abetting, or (3) by the doctrine of PAL. Chan Kam Shing agrees with this taxonomy 
only as far as joint perpetration and aiding and abetting are concerned (at [8-20]). It 
perceives of joint criminal enterprise as involving two distinct doctrines: basic joint 
enterprise aka ‘common purpose’ liability on the one side (where two or more 
individuals agree on the commission of a crime which is then committed), and 
extended joint enterprise aka PAL on the other (concerning crimes unilaterally 
committed incidentally to the agreed offence). 
Against this backdrop, the abandonment of PAL by Jogee is understood by Chan 
Kam Shing to encompass also the abandonment of the doctrine of common purpose. 
Because it does not wish to abandon the latter, the HKCFA is loath to lose the former. 
It needs emphasising, however, that the decision in Jogee does not refer to common 
purpose as the ‘wrong turn’ but to PAL specifically. On Jogee’s framework of 
complicity the one does not even encompass the other: PAL is there seen as a new 
principle laid down by the Privy Council in Chan Wing-Siu (Jogee, at [62]). While 
Jogee makes frequent reference to ‘common purpose’ in its historical overview of 
accessorial liability, it is not treating this as a head of liability but rather as forming 
part of the evidential matrix to establish aiding and abetting: ‘The long-standing pre -
Chan Wing-Siu practice of inferring intent to assist from a common criminal purpose 
which includes the further crime, if the occasion for it were to arise, was always a 
legitimate one; what was illegitimate was to treat foresight as an inevitable yardstick 
of common purpose’ (Jogee, at [87]). It is difficult to verify the historical accuracy of 
either position; however, what is clear is that, since Jogee and Chan Kam Shing rely 
on different taxonomies, the two judgments are at cross-purposes. 
The difference in taxonomy also accounts for the differing views taken regarding the 
blameworthiness of secondary parties in a joint enterprise. The Court’s objections to 
treating these as ‘having a lesser culpability’ (at [61]) than the perpetrator follows 
logically from the Court’s characterisation of the secondary party’s liability as 
independent and primary in nature rather than derivative and secondary. On this view, 
participants in an extended joint enterprise are ‘gravely culpable’ (at [65]) because 
their wrongdoing ‘lies in the mutual embarkation on a crime with the awareness that 
the incidental crime may be committed in executing their agreement’ (at [64]). This is 
mere assertion. Participating in crime A with foresight of crime B is not the moral 
equivalent of participating in crime B. Ribeiro PJ seems to appreciate this himself, 
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because, still under the heading of culpability, he puts forward another justification, 
namely that the secondary party must be regarded ‘as tacitly agreeing to or 
“authorising” the crime by the actual perpetrator which he foresaw as a possible 
incident of a joint criminal enterprise’ (at [67]). This is not, however, an alternative to 
the prior argument; it is entirely free-standing and much more convincing. Unlike the 
former, it is able to accommodate Lord Mustill’s ‘puzzling case’. Briefly, Lord 
Mustill in R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1 at 11 found it difficult to account for the PAL 
liability of an accomplice who had expressed his opposition to crime B in the run-up 
to crime A, but continued to participate in crime A notwithstanding (for whatever 
reasons, some much less culpable than others). Such a person could not be said 
thereby to have ‘authorised’ the perpetrator to commit crime B – and would thus not 
be caught in the net of PAL. The HKCFA does not expressly deal with this or it 
would realise that the two explanations it puts forward for retaining PAL lead to 
diametrically opposed results in such cases: authorisation provides a link between the 
secondary party’s conduct and crime B committed by the perpetrator. This link is 
missing under the first, assertion-based, explanation. 
 
Chan Kam Shing cites the loss of the common purpose doctrine as another reason for 
rejecting Jogee, explaining that those who agreed on a joint enterprise are 
blameworthy almost like principal offenders, ‘whichever one of them actually carried 
out the actus reus’ (at [63]). However, on a proper understanding of the complicity 
model underlying Jogee, common purpose has not really been abandoned; it is what 
informs the attribution principles of joint perpetration (which Jogee left untouched). 
 
The real problem seems to be that Jogee does not quite realise the full logic of its own 
taxonomy. If one of two joint principals goes further than expressly agreed, evidence 
that his actions were still covered by the other’s (conditional) intent should lead the 
court to find that the scope of their joint wrongdoing includes the further offence, so 
that the non-acting associate continues to be liable as a joint principal rather than as 
an accessory. If we came to accept that the net of liability for co-perpetration is cast 
rather too narrowly, at the expense of the law of aiding and abetting, where crimes 
incidental to a (genuine) common plan or purpose are concerned, some of the 
concerns voiced by the HKCFA in Chan Kam Shing might yet be resolved within the 
framework of complicity as envisaged by the UKSC in Jogee and, indeed, with 
recourse to a concept of common purpose. 
 
Jogee relies on the idea of conditional intent ‘in order to deal with situational 
uncertainties’ (at [76]). The HKCFA takes the view that conditional intent is unsuited 
for this purpose, arguing that the UKSC leaves open how conditional intent is meant 
to fit in with ‘the actus reus and mens rea of traditional accessorial offences’, 
explaining the concept instead ‘in the context of joint criminal enterprise (referring to 
acts pursuant to “prior joint criminal ventures”, “common purpose” and “common 
intent”)’ (at [76]). The Court also finds that ‘[t]he proposition that a finding of 
foresight is only evidence of conditional intent is … difficult to follow’, as foresight 
itself will usually be an inferential conclusion (at [78]). An alternative, the Court 
argues, is not to read Jogee as permitting ‘one inference on top of another, but that 
liability can only be established … if the irresistible inference to be drawn is that the 
participant harboured a conditional intent and not just foresight of the possible 
commission of crime B’ (at [79]). However, the Court does not think this 
interpretation to be any less problematic, since ‘the prosecution would be required to 
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prove beyond reasonable doubt that the participant not only foresaw the possible 
commission of the further offence … but intended, that is, desired or believed as a 
virtual certainty, that it should contingently occur. This would impose an unjustifiably 
high burden on the prosecution and inappropriately exculpate participants who 
commit themselves to a joint criminal enterprise fully foreseeing – but not desiring or 
viewing as virtually certain – the commission of the further offence …’ (at [79]). 
 
It is true that the UKSC’s analysis of conditional intent is somewhat opaque and that 
it falls back on language that is (also) associated with the doctrine of joint enterprise. 
However, on the taxonomy underpinning Jogee, co-perpetration and aiding and 
abetting continue to give rise to joint enterprises, understood here as an umbrella term 
to designate multi-handed undertakings. The use of joint enterprise language to 
explain conditional intent is thus consistent with using this concept to determine the 
scope of the undertaking that was to be assisted or encouraged. Although assistance 
does not presuppose a meeting of the minds between perpetrator and accessory, in 
reality there will often be some interaction (as Jogee and Chan Kam Shing illustrate) 
resulting in a rough, albeit dynamic, plot. The UKSC’s approach is clearly pragmatic: 
it aims to establish whether, from the defendant’s perspective, if things turn out one 
way rather than another, the parties would still have understood this to be covered by 
their undertaking.  
 
It is also true that the UKSC suggests that foresight might still be a powerful piece of 
evidence allowing a jury to conclude that the secondary party intended crime B, albeit 
only ‘in certain contingencies’ (at [77]). This suggestion could well be said to be open 
to the same objections as the logical gap in the traditional PAL analysis that 
participation in crime A with foresight of crime B suffices to ground liability for 
crime B. To make things worse, the common law is still unclear in its definition of 
intention. Everybody is agreed that where P acts with the purpose to bring about a 
proscribed result, that is the paradigm case of intention. However, under Woollin 
[1999] 1 A.C. 82, where the outcome was not the purpose of the act, intention must 
not be found unless the actor appreciated that the outcome was in fact virtually certain 
to follow from his actions. Simester argues that there is no reason why this should be 
different where the intent of the accessory is concerned: ‘S must either act in order to 
assist P to commit a burglary (i.e. because for some reason S has an interest in P’s 
committing it), or act in the practical certainty that his or her conduct will assist P to 
commit a burglary. Will, not may’ ((2017) 133 LQR 73 at 84). Cham Kam Shing 
seems to agree. But this is doubtful after Jogee, where the UKSC can be understood 
to suggest that it remains open to juries to make the inference to intention (whether 
direct or indirect) from foresight in whatever degree (see Jogee, at [94]). 
 
There are two ways to deal with this: either, Jogee must be read against the 
background of Woollin, and passages that are inconsistent with Woollin must be 
disregarded, re-interpreted or distinguished. Or one could argue that Jogee has 
impliedly overruled Woollin. If the former, the concept of conditional intent would 
appear extremely difficult to satisfy, and this, as the HKCFA explains [at 80-93], 
leads to a watering down of how it is proven in practice. The English Court of Appeal 
decisions in Anwar [2016] EWCA Crim 551; [2016] 4 WLR 127 and Johnson [2016] 
EWCA Crim 1613; [2017] 1 Cr App R. 12 indeed demonstrate an understanding of 
conditional intent that is not very far removed from the foresight requirement that 
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Jogee has supposedly abolished, and the HKCFA is quick to point out that English 
law is thus ‘drifting back’ to a position resembling PAL [at 92-93].  
 
If, on the other hand, Woollin is thrown into doubt, what is to be put in its place? It 
could be argued that both Jogee and Chan Kam Shing missed a trick in failing to 
explore the idea of ‘authorisation’ further. It is mentioned in both cases (at [67] in 
Chan Kam Shing; at [65-66] in Jogee), as well as in Miller [2016] HCA 30 [at 139, 
142-144], but its potential is underestimated by all three. Authorisation might well 
replace the cognitive ‘virtual certainty’ approach in Woollin, placing intention firmly 
on a volitional footing (which is where it belongs).  
 
To conclude, while it is regrettable that Chan Kam Shing refuses to follow Jogee, the 
decision is helpful in showing up some of the difficulties with the post-Jogee position. 
Both co-perpetration and accessorial liability need criteria by which to determine the 
‘scope of the enterprise’. Jogee took the first step towards developing such criteria, 
but there is, as the HKCFA astutely observes, a real danger that, with a very 
demanding threshold of intention, the courts will revert to foresight as the decisive 
criterion, albeit as a matter of evidence rather than substance. What is needed is a 
more flexible, yet meaningful, definition of intention (to be complicit in someone 
else’s crime). The idea of ‘authorisation’, now having in one way or another been 
kept in play by the top courts of the UK, Australia and Hong Kong, might just be it.  
 
Beatrice Krebs 
 
